Are IPOs of different VCs different? by Tykvová, Tereza & Walz, Uwe
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 2004/02 
Are IPOs of Different VCs Different? 
 
Tereza Tykvová, Uwe Walz   
 
   
 
Center for Financial Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Center for Financial Studies is a nonprofit research organization, supported by an 
association of more than 120 banks, insurance companies, industrial corporations and 
public institutions. Established in 1968 and closely affiliated with the University of 
Frankfurt, it provides a strong link between the financial community and academia. 
The CFS Working Paper Series presents the result of scientific research on selected top-
ics in the field of money, banking and finance. The authors were either participants in 
the Center´s Research Fellow Program or members of one of the Center´s Research Pro-
jects. 
If you would like to know more about the Center for Financial Studies, please let us 
know of your interest. 
 
    
Prof. Dr. Jan Pieter Krahnen  Prof. Volker Wieland, Ph.D. aAddress of authors: Tereza Tykvová, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), P.O.Box 103443, 68034 
Mannheim, Germany, E-mail: tykvova@zew.de;  
bUwe Walz, Goethe-University Frankfurt/M., Department of Economics, Schumannstr. 60, 60059 Frankfurt, 
Germany, E-mail: uwe.walz@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de 
*This paper is part of a CFS research program on ”Venture Capital and the New Markets in Europe”. Financial 
support by the CFS is gratefully acknowledged. The present version has benefited from comments of seminar 
participants at the Third Workshop of the ECB-CFS Research Network on Capital Markets and Financial 
Integration in Europe, Athen and at the European Business School, Eltville. We would like to thank Andrea 
Alexandra Nowak for excellent research assistance. Eva Schneider and Susanne Büsselmann did substantial 
work in data collection. 
 
CFS Working Paper No. 2004/02 
Are IPOs of Different VCs Different? 
Tereza Tykvová
a, Uwe Walz
b 
29
th January 2004 
 
Abstract:  
This paper aims to analyze the impact of different types of venture capitalists on the 
performance of their portfolio firms around and after the IPO. We thereby investigate the 
hypothesis that different governance structures, objectives and track record of different types 
of VCs have a significant impact on their respective IPOs. We explore this hypothesis by 
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contrary, firms backed by public VCs (being small and having a high book-to-market ratio) 
showed relative underperformance. 
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 1 Introduction
Venture capital and initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) are closely interrelated. Venture
capital crucially relies on the IPO market as an exit channel. It is often argued that
without a viable IPO market venture capital can not survive (see e.g. Black/Gilson
(1998)). Due to the fact that venture capital is a temporary engagement in the
respective portfolio ﬁrm,1 exiting is decisive for the venture capitalist (VC) and the
expectation of potential exit possibilities governs the behavior of venture capitalists
during the investment phase (see Cumming (2002)). Venture capitalists disinvest
their most promising and proﬁtable ﬁrms via an IPO.
On the contrary, venture capital serves as an important source for (successful)
IPOs. Without promising young ﬁrms demanding equity from organized markets,
the IPO markets would obviously lack demand. Since VCs are intermediaries special-
ized in bringing up young (innovative) ﬁrms, a functioning venture capital industry
serves as an ingredient of the IPO market.
Under these circumstances it is important to understand the role venture cap-
italists play with respect to the IPO performance (around and after the IPO) of
their portfolio ﬁrms. There are a number of studies analyzing the impact of ven-
ture capital on underpricing and long-run performance. We distinguish our analysis
from the existing ones by looking into the diﬀerences between diﬀerent types of VCs.
The starting point of our analysis is the observation that VCs diﬀer considerably
in their objectives, structure and corporate governance. Our working hypothesis
is that these diﬀerences have a signiﬁcant impact on the market performance of
the respective portfolio ﬁrms. The basic idea behind is that diﬀerent VCs resolve
informational asymmetries and incentive problems to a diﬀerent degree. A natural
playing ﬁeld for this hypotheses is the German venture capital and IPO market with
its wide variety of diﬀerent types of VCs. Due to the fast growth and institutional
background, we ﬁnd a large variance among venture capital ﬁrms being active in
the German market.2 In order to pursue our analysis we hand-collected a data base
for all IPOs on the Neuer Markt during the period 1997-2002.3
1This can be seen as a mechanism to resolve informational asymmetry and incentive prob-
lems between the venture capitalist and its investors (see e.g. Gompers/Lerner (1999b)). It is
institutionalized in the fact that venture capital funds are typically organized as closed-end funds.
2Independent VCs, bank-dependent VCs, public VCs, corporate VCs, young and experienced
VCs, international and national VCs, etc.
3Neuer Markt was founded in March 1997 and closed in June 2003. However, in 2003 there
were no IPOs on this market segment.
1Our main results are as follows: We ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences among diﬀerent
types of VCs with respect to the post-IPO market performance. It turns out that
ﬁrms backed by independent VCs perform signiﬁcantly better than the ﬁrms of other
VCs or non venture-backed ones. Firms backed by public VCs (a, however, small
group of ﬁrms) underperform relative to their counterparts. In addition, we ﬁnd
that the shares of ﬁrms backed by independent VCs ﬂuctuate signiﬁcantly less than
their counterparts. That is, independent VCs bring about higher (relative) post-IPO
returns and less risk. This result is robust to diﬀerent methodological approaches.
Therefore, it turns out that it is quite useful to split up the group of venture-
backed ﬁrms, which in other studies has been treated as more or less homogenous.
The fact that this was possible to occur (implying that market participants did not
anticipate this to happen) can be interpreted as a clear sign for the immaturity
of the market. This interpretation, however, leads us to the hypothesis that such
abnormalities tend to go away as the market grows older and becomes more mature.
There are a number of studies comparing venture-backed and non venture-backed
IPOs addressing the issue of post-IPO performance as well as underpricing. Follow-
ing Rock (1986), quite a substantial body looks into the impact of venture capital
on the degree of underpricing. Studies investigating the eﬀect of venture capital do
not come up with a clear-cut picture. In an early study, Megginson/Weiss (1991)
stress the certiﬁcation role of venture capital. They ﬁnd a negative impact of ven-
ture capital on underpricing. Barry et al. (1990) show, by looking at a sample of
venture-backed IPOs, that a higher monitoring eﬀort by VCs leads to less under-
pricing. On the contrary, Ljungqvist (1999) and Smart/Zutter (2003) challenge this
view by analyzing US data. Ljungqvist (1999) relates the degree of underpricing
to the behavior of old shareholders in general and not to the role of VCs per se.
Smart/Zutter (2003) ﬁnd more underpricing with venture-backed ﬁrms than with
non venture-backed ones. In a study of the German IPO market (using by and
large a very similar data set as ours), Franzke (2001) ﬁnds, too, that venture-backed
IPOs are more underpriced than non venture-backed IPOs. On the other hand, sev-
eral studies address post-IPO performance. The message is, however, ambiguous:
positive, neutral or negative impact of venture capital ﬁnancing can be observed.
Brav/Gompers (1997) show that in the U.S. from 1975-1992, venture-backed IPOs
outperformed non venture-backed IPOs when measured via equal weighted returns.
However, this result cannot be conﬁrmed using other methods. Doukas/Gonenc
(2001) do not ﬁnd any impact of venture capital on the long-run performance. Au-
dretsch/Lehmann (2002) analyze the survival of companies on the Neuer Markt and
2ﬁnd that the likelihood of ﬁrm survival decreases as the ownership share of the group
of VCs increases which indicates a negative eﬀect of venture capital.
None of these articles, however, splits up the group of venture capitalists by
looking into the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of VCs. Recently, Rindermann (2003) dis-
tinguishes between diﬀerent types of VCs (public, bank-dependent and independent;
national and international) in his analysis of the operating and market performance
of IPOs in Germany, France and Great Britain. He uses a diﬀerent sample (only
1997 - 1999) and diﬀerent methodologies from those employed in our study. In line
with our results, he ﬁnds a positive impact of international VCs and a negative inﬂu-
ence of public VCs on the stock price performance (using three-year wealth relatives
with NEMAX All Share Index as benchmark).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section displays a short historical
and structural overview of the German venture capital and IPO markets. In this
setting our data set is described and some descriptive statistics are given. The third
section analyzes the impact of diﬀerent types of VCs on post-IPO performance and
contains the main body of our analysis. There, we address post-IPO returns as well
as post-IPO volatility of shares prices. In a ﬁrst step, we use a cross-section analysis
to address the determinants of post-IPO performance in a two-year period. In the
second step, a matching approach is used to investigate post-IPO returns. In a ﬁnal
step of the third section we consider the post-IPO idiosyncratic volatility of returns
and the inﬂuence of diﬀerent types of VCs on this volatility. The fourth section
is devoted to an analysis of underpricing in Germany’s Neuer Markt by taking the
VC’s inﬂuence, especially of diﬀerent types of VC, into consideration. The last
section concludes.
2 The Structure of the German Venture Capital
and IPO Market
Before delving into the details of our analysis, a short overview of the German
venture capital and IPO markets will provide some insights which are quite helpful
for the future analysis.
2.1 Structure and History
One of the main characteristics of the German venture capital and IPO markets is
that the main developments occurred in rather recent times. Before 1990 only a
few venture capitalists existed. These few were mainly quasi-public agencies which
3were established to promote regional policies (the so-called Mittelst¨ andische Beteili-
gungsgesellschaften). In the period from 1965 to 1985 a number of ﬁrms entered
the German market, concentrating mainly, however, on later stage investing. As
early as in the 1980s an attempt to initiate venture capital in Germany badly failed
(see Becker/Hellmann (2000) for details). The experiment initiated in 1975 by the
German government with support from the domestic banking industry led the main
ﬁnancial institutions to the conclusion that venture capital and private equity was
not part of their (core-) business. The ﬁnancial system was dominated by the
banking industry which gave credit (or not) to young innovative ﬁrms. Access to
organized capital markets was deﬁnitely the exception. Only few ﬁrms (mainly es-
tablished, medium- and large-sized ﬁrms) undertook an IPO. In the period between
1970 and 1996 no more than 301 IPOs took place in Germany.
Until the 1990s the venture capital industry in Germany grew rather slowly. This
changed quite drastically in the 1990s. The ﬁrst push came through reuniﬁcation,
leading to the establishment of private equity and venture capital especially in East
Germany. These operations were clearly driven by subsidies and dominated by
public agencies (the Mittelst¨ andische Beteiligungsgesellschaften). The second push
occurred after 1995 and was paralleled by the establishment of the Neuer Markt
in 1997. The growth rates of venture capital activities (either measured by capital
invested or by the establishment of venture capital ﬁrms) accelerated substantially
(see ﬁg. 1).
Starting in 1997 with 11 initial public oﬀerings, the Neuer Markt went through an
unprecedented growth period. 41 IPOs in 1998 were followed by 130 IPOs in 1999.
This number was even overtaken in 2000, the absolute peak of the market with
133 IPOs. But already in the second half of 2000, market conditions deteriorated
and market valuations went down making IPOs more and more diﬃcult. This was
reﬂected by the drastic slow-down in the number of IPOs: In 2001 only 11 ﬁrms
went public. In 2002 it became even more extreme, only a single ﬁrm made it on
the Neuer Markt. This was the last ﬁrm with an IPO on the Neuer Markt, the
brand disappeared after several cases of fraud and a massive reduction in market
valuation. A restructuring of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange led to a transfer of the
ﬁrms from the Neuer Markt to other market segments.
For a while the Neuer Markt seemed to have resolved the exit problem of venture
capital ﬁrms. Of the 327 Neuer Markt IPOs 123 were venture-backed (according to
our deﬁnition).4 The boom in the IPO activity was accompanied with a large inﬂow
of capital into the venture capital market. This also led to the creation of many
4See the next subsection for details.
4Figure 1: The yearly growth rates of the gross investments and number of venture
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new venture capital ﬁrms as well as to the entrance of a considerable number of VCs
from abroad into the German venture capital market (either through takeovers of
local VCs or via the establishment of local branches in Germany). By and large it is
fair to state that the German venture capital industry is quite a young one with not
many portfolio managers having an experience in the industry exceeding ﬁve years.
For our purpose it is decisive that, due to a number of special inﬂuences in the
German venture capital market, we observe a wide variety of VC-types and thereby
governance structures. First, traditionally and as a result of the overall economic
policy, there is a large proportion of venture capital organizations which are basically
owned or controlled by the state or public agencies. We will refer to these VCs as
public VCs since their main objective is in most cases not the maximization of
returns for their investors but rather the promotion of local ﬁrms. In any case,
their concentration on proﬁt maximization is much less pronounced than with the
independent VCs. Second, as a result of the rapid growth of the venture capital
market, a considerable proportion of the independent VCs are from abroad, with a
quite diﬀerent governance structure, corporate culture and track record compared
5especially to their public and corporate counterparts. This diﬀerences are, e.g., also
reﬂected in the design of the contracts with their portfolio ﬁrms (see for evidence
in this respect Bascha/Walz (2002)) as well as their pre-IPO investment behavior
and exit strategies (see Tykvov´ a (2003a)). Third, in the 1990s many players in
the banking industry established their own private equity and/or venture capital
subsidiaries. The portfolio managers of these VCs act as employees of the mother
company rather than partners of an independent VC. There has been some discussion
in the literature about the motivation of banks to enter the venture capital market
with an own subsidiary (see e.g. Hellmann et al. (2003)). All this makes an
investigation of the impact of bank-dependent VCs on their portfolio ﬁrms (in the
course of an IPO) worthwhile. Finally, we observe several corporate VCs.
In contrast to many other countries, the types of VCs other than the indepen-
dent ones have a considerable market share in Germany. This is especially true for
the public ones. Despite this fact, the proportion of public VCs in our IPO sample
is rather small. The main reason for this is that we focus on the lead VCs, whereas
public VCs often syndicate with other VCs leaving the leadership with their syndi-
cation partner. In addition, public VCs often invest in ﬁrms for which other exit
strategies than IPO are clearly dominant. That is, the entrepreneurs do not consider
the IPO as an interesting exit strategy in the ﬁrst place and make sure that they
are able to pursue other exit strategies (mainly buying back the ﬁrm). In addition,
due to their speciﬁc structure in which proﬁt maximization and the building-up of
reputation is not the prevalent target, public VCs are not that interested in IPOs
themselves. This is reﬂected in the actual exit strategies of ﬁrms ﬁnanced by public
VCs (see BVK (2002) for the exit behavior of the Mittelst¨ andische Beteiligungsge-
sellschaften5).
We use these observations as the main starting point of our analysis, namely to
look into the impact of diﬀerent types of VCs on the performance of ﬁrms around
and after the IPO. To a certain extent this wide variety of types of venture capital
ﬁrms is reﬂected in our sample of venture-backed IPOs. Of the 123 ﬁrms ﬁnanced
by venture capital, ten were backed by a public VC, 8 by a corporate VC whereas in
38 cases the lead VC was a bank-dependent VC. The remaining 66 companies were
backed by an independent VC. For one ﬁrm (VIVA) we cannot ascertain the names
of the VCs. In the entire sample we classify 61 cases as backed by a non-German VC,
50 from them being independent VCs, nine bank-dependent VCs and two corporate
VCs.
552.2 % (199) of the portfolio ﬁrms in 2001 were exited via a buy-back, 45.9 % (175 ﬁrms) via
liquidation and only 1 ﬁrm via an IPO.
62.2 The Data Set
Our analysis is based on a unique hand-collected database of IPOs on Germany’s
Neuer Markt. We considered only “real” IPOs. Thus, we excluded ﬁrms that were
listed on another exchange when going public on the Neuer Markt. The data were
obtained from several sources. From the Deutsche B¨ orse AG, we received the fol-
lowing data: date of the IPO, oﬀer price, ﬁrst price, issue size, classiﬁcation of the
industry, names of Designated Sponsors6 and the shareholder structure immediately
after the IPO.
The information on the duration of the venture capital ﬁnancing before the
IPO, the ﬁrm age and size, the name(s) of the lead underwriter(s), the shareholder
structure (prior to and immediately after the IPO) and the book value at the IPO
was collected from the listing prospectuses of the companies. Some of these data
could have been cross-checked with the information from the Deutsche B¨ orse AG.
We considered a ﬁrm as venture-backed if at least one of its shareholders was
aﬃliated at a national or an international venture capital association and owned at
least ﬁve percent of the pre-IPO equity. In its short history, there were 327 IPOs on
the Neuer Markt. According to our deﬁnition, 123 of them were venture-backed.7
The venture capital ﬁrm which held the largest share of the equity prior to the IPO
was labelled the lead VC.
The data on venture capitalists (size, aﬃliation(s), age, type) were brought to-
gether from the following sources: the VentureXpert database, the directories of the
German, European and US venture capital associations (BVK, EVCA, NVCA) and
Webpages of venture capital ﬁrms on the Internet. The rank coeﬃcient was based
equally on the size and the age of the lead venture capital ﬁrm. We divided the
venture-backed ﬁrms into four subgroups depending on the institutional aﬃliation
of the lead VC. We distinguished between four types: public, bank- (or insurance-)
dependent, independent and corporate VCs. Further, we looked whether or not the
headquarter of the lead venture capital ﬁrm was in Germany.
The rank of an underwriter depended on his activities as the lead underwriter,
namely the number of new issues on the Neuer Markt and their volume in the
precedent period, and was determined yearly. The rank of a Designated Sponsor
was based equally on the number of his mandates on the Neuer Markt and on his
6Each share on the Neuer Markt had to have at least two Designated Sponsors. Their main
task was to provide liquidity for the trading of this security.
7One of the venture-backed ﬁrms, VIVA, was removed from the sample since we have no infor-
mation on the names and the respective shareholdings of the venture capitalists who ﬁnanced this
ﬁrm.
7rating by the Deutsche B¨ orse AG in the preceding period and was set up quarterly.
The reputation measures were designed in the following way: The lower the number,
the better the rank (thus, 1 indicates the best rank).
The index (NEMAX All Share, DAX 100) returns and the data on individual
stock prices and dividends come from the Bloomberg database. A few companies
were not found in Bloomberg, we used Thomson Financial Datastream instead. For
two ﬁrms, FOCUS Digital AG and RT-SET Real Time Synthesized Entertainment
Technology Ltd., we did not ﬁnd data on returns in either database. For seven
ﬁrms that went public later than March 2001, we have no data on two-year-returns
because our time-series on returns end in March 2003. Eight ﬁrms left the market
within two years.
Table 1 comprises our main variables and their abbreviations. All ﬁnancial data
before 1999 were converted into Euros.
Table 1: List of variables used
MARKET
HOTISSUE* One, if the ﬁrm went public during the hot issue period, zero otherwise
MARKET2Y 2-year post-IPO NEMAX All Share buy-and-hold return
RECENT Underpricing of the ﬁve preceding new issues on the Neuer Markt
FIRM
MV Market value at the IPO (Mil. Euro)
BTM Book-to-market (¤10¡6)
AGE Firm age at the IPO (in days)
RETURN2Y 2-year post-IPO buy-and-hold return
ABNORMAL2Y RETURN2Y - MARKET2Y
UNDERPRICING (First price - oﬀer price) / oﬀer price
SIZE Issue size (based on the oﬀer price, in Euro)
VENTURE CAPITALIST(S)
VC One, if the ﬁrm is venture-backed, zero otherwise
PUBLIC One, if the lead VC is public, zero otherwise
BANK One, if the lead VC is a ﬁnancial service / banking / insurance company
or their subsidiary, zero otherwise
CORP One, if the lead VC is a corporate VC, zero otherwise
INDEP One, if the lead VC is an independent venture capital ﬁrm, zero otherwise
GERM One, if the lead VC is German, zero otherwise
PREIPOLENGTH Duration of the pre-IPO venture capital equity ﬁnancing (in days)
RANK Rank of the lead VC, depending on its age and size;
range: 1 (highest rank) - 5 (lowest rank)
LOCK Extent of the lock-up by the group of venture capitalists
(% of their old shares retained beyond the IPO)
OTHER MARKET PARTICIPANTS
DSRANK Rank of the Designated Sponsors (average), depending on
their rating and the number of companies they manage;
range: 1 (highest rank) - 10 (lowest rank)
UNDRANK Rank of the lead underwriter (if more lead underwriters:
the average of their rank), depending on the number of issues and
their volumes; range: 1 (highest rank) - 10 (lowest rank)
¤The time horizon between March 1, 1999 and November 30, 2000 was labelled the hot issue period.
82.3 Some Descriptive Statistics
IPOs on Germany’s Neuer Markt took place in a setting of pronounced volatility
in shares prices. The market development can be split into three parts (see table
2). In the ﬁrst one, the beginning phase, share prices moved steadily upward. The
second one, a hot issue period of 1999 and 2000 combines exploding share prices
with a large number of IPOs (see table 3).8 The last period is characterized by a
rapid decline in share prices associated with a deterioration of the IPO-activity and
a large number of company scandals, which lead ﬁnally to the closing-down of the
Neuer Markt in June 2003.
Table 2: Market development (1997-2003)
This table displays the broad market development by reporting the level of the NEMAX All
Share Index at the end of each quarter.
Q/Year 03/97 06/97 09/97 12/97 03/98 06/98 09/98 12/98 03/99 06/99 09/99 12/99 03/00
Nemax 606 786 942 1000 2182 2333 2110 2745 3242 3412 2680 4572 6629
Q/Year 06/00 09/00 12/00 03/01 06/01 09/01 12/01 03/02 06/02 09/02 12/02 03/03 06/03
Nemax 5369 4875 2743 1684 1503 843 1095 1029 664 389 405 385 517
IPOs were rather heavily concentrated in 1999 and 2000. For our purpose it is
important to note that, in the main part, the diﬀerent types of VCs do not show
special concentration of their IPOs in one particular period or year, thereby not
deviating from the overall trend.
In order to give a ﬁrst impression of the characteristics of the IPOs of the diﬀerent
types of VCs, table 4 displays the main variables and relates them to the diﬀerent
types of VCs. The IPOs diﬀer widely in size in our sample. Small issues have to be
compared with a few real “heavy-weights” with a market value of a couple of billion
Euros (up to 43 billion Euros). Bank-dependent and public VCs were engaged in
signiﬁcantly smaller issues (SIZE) from ﬁrms with a lower market value (MV).
With respect to book-to-market ratios (BTM) we face a number of ﬁrms having
negative book-to-market ratios. Since there are no objections against using these
observations we left them in the sample. Bank-dependent VCs show signiﬁcantly
higher book-to-market ratios than their counterparts on average. On the contrary,
independent VCs concentrated mainly on growth stocks.
8Table 3 includes an additional (venture-backed) ﬁrm, VIVA, which went public on the Neuer
Markt. Since we do not have any information on the lead VC (and its type) we excluded it from
our data sample and, thus, are not able to give any information about the type of the VC in this
table.
9Table 3: IPOs on Germany’s Neuer Markt over time
This table depicts the number of IPOs on the Neuer Markt, sorted
by year and type of VC.
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
P
No. of IPOs 11 41 130 133 11 1 327
VC 7 15 45 53 3 0 123
INDEP 2 7 25 30 2 0 66
BANK 4 8 12 14 0 0 38
CORP 0 0 2 6 0 0 8
PUBLIC 1 0 6 2 1 0 10
The two-year abnormal returns (ABNORMAL2Y) vary widely as well. Since we
consider the diﬀerence between individual returns and the market return (NEMAX
All Share Index), timing issues are potentially eliminated. The remarkable diﬀer-
ences in average abnormal returns among venture-backed and non venture-backed
IPOs as well as for ﬁrms backed by independent VCs which turn out to be signif-
icant, already indicate that there are strong diﬀerences which might also show up
when controlling for other factors of inﬂuence.
The UNDERPRICING variable displays mostly positive levels in some cases at
exorbitant levels. The univariate t-test, however, does not detect any signiﬁcant
diﬀerences among the groups with the exception of corporate VCs which exhibit a
lower degree of underpricing for their portfolio ﬁrms on average.
Our subsample of venture-backed ﬁrms contains quite diﬀerent types of venture
capital ﬁnancing arrangements. Obviously, some just represent bridge ﬁnancing
with a rather short period of engagement (represented by the PREIPOLENGTH
variable) of the VC in the portfolio ﬁrm. Especially bank-dependent and public
VCs have on average a rather short holding period. Thus, they often are simply not
able to fulﬁll the task of an active investor and monitor due to their short holding
period. The reverse is true for the independent VCs who have a signiﬁcantly longer
duration of the pre-IPO ﬁnancing period on average.
Overall table 4 reveals a rather pronounced variations of the diﬀerent variables
among the ﬁrms backed by diﬀerent types of VCs.
10Table 4: Realizations of main variables for diﬀerent types of VCs
This table contains some descriptive statistics of our main variables as well as tests on the equality of
means and medians of the variables for the respective groups and the rest. Before employing a t-test for
the respective means we test for equal variances. If the null-hypothesis of equal variances is rejected at
the 5 % signiﬁcance level, we use a t-test with unequal variances otherwise we use a t-test with equal
variances (in italics). Additionally, a nonparametric two-sample test on the equality of medians with the
test chi-squared statistic without a continuity correction is employed and its p-value is reported.
The sample includes all venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs in the 1997-2002 period on the
Neuer Markt, Frankfurt. We excluded VIVA (all variables) and EM.TV (ABNORMAL2Y).
One, two and three asterisks point to signiﬁcance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. An asterisk in brackets
indicates signiﬁcance at the 15 percent level.
Variable Subsample Observations Mean Minimum Maximum p-value p-value
(mean) (median)
MV NON-VC 204 561.8 26.0 42867.0
VC 122 251.9 29.0 1716.7 0.150(*) 0.492
INDEP 66 303.6 45.6 1716.7 0.300 0.270
BANK 38 183.5 60.1 632.9 0.053* 0.038**
CORP 8 285.5 68.0 996.3 0.345 0.152
PUBLIC 10 142.8 29.0 555.0 0.034** 0.054*
BTM NON-VC 204 26611 -272002 242827
VC 122 27292 -63831 131664 0.866 0.252
INDEP 66 20681 -63831 102144 0.090* 0.168
BANK 38 38659 -15466 131664 0.041** 0.016**
CORP 8 20681 5278 31455 0.117(*) 0.474
PUBLIC 10 33016 -12973 115958 0.602 0.199
ABNORMAL2Y NON-VC 190 -0.092 -3.009 5.245
VC 118 0.290 -4.215 18.389 0.100* 0.348
INDEP 63 0.536 -2.017 18.389 0.099* 0.323
BANK 38 0.143 -3.989 8.803 0.779 1.000
CORP 8 0.015 -0.194 0.212 0.713 0.474
PUBLIC 9 -0.569 -4.215 0.495 0.251 0.735
UNDERPRICING NON-VC 204 0.473 -0.250 4.333
VC 122 0.510 -0.118 3.400 0.649 0.492
INDEP 66 0.506 -0.118 2.231 0.786 0.270
BANK 38 0.534 -0.077 3.400 0.668 0.730
CORP 8 0.255 0.000 1.000 0.091* 1.000
PUBLIC 10 0.653 0.000 2.061 0.459 1.000
PREIPOLENGTH VC 106 602 13 2990
INDEP 61 711 13 2412 0.020** 0.031**
BANK 31 410 22 2990 0.024** 0.019**
CORP 7 806 75 1726 0.325 0.241
PUBLIC 7 300 37 891 0.144(*) 0.241
SIZE (¤106) NON-VC 203 83 8 3080
VC 121 58 10 302 0.148(*) 0.206
INDEP 65 68 14 302 0.612 0.018**
BANK 38 44 11 197 0.014** 0.167
CORP 8 86 41 219 0.615 0.004***
PUBLIC 10 25 10 58 0.000*** 0.054*
113 Post-IPO Performance
3.1 Background
Starting with the analysis of Ritter (1991) and Loughran/Ritter (1995) the post-
IPO performance of ﬁrms has attracted a lot of attention. Since then, a number
of papers have challenged the initial ﬁndings by proposing diﬀerent empirical tech-
niques without really being able to fully explain the underperformance puzzle (see
e.g. Barber/Lyon (1997), Lyon et al. (1999), and Kothari/Warner (1997)).
Brav/Gompers (1997) were the ﬁrst who investigated the role of VCs in the
long-run market performance of IPOs. They show that the underperformance doc-
umented in the initial studies comes mainly from small, non venture-backed IPOs.
Thus, within the group of small companies, venture-backed ﬁrms are better prepared
to perform well in the aftermath of the IPO.
Venture capitalists, however, diﬀer to a large extent and do represent a quite
dispers group of ﬁnancial intermediaries. Depending on their main investor(s), we
observe a wide heterogeneity of corporate governance as well as objectives and in
particular experience among VCs. This heterogeneity exists in most countries and is
especially pronounced in the continental European economies, particularly in Ger-
many. The existence of a large public sector and an interventionist culture led to
the establishment of a considerable number of public VCs. Given the country’s
bank-dominated ﬁnancial system it is not too surprising that commercial banks
have created their own venture capital funds which played an important role in
the German venture capital market in the last couple of years. Finally, corporate
venture capitalists exist in Germany. They are mainly subsidiaries of their (indus-
trial) mother companies and therefore often possess a diﬀerent legal and economic
structure compared to their independent counterparts.
In the following we will analyze the hypothesis that the diﬀerent objectives of the
diﬀerent types of VCs (see on this e.g. Hellmann et al. (2003) and Gompers/Lerner
(2000)), the diversity of these VCs’ corporate governance (see Cumming (2000))
and experience (see Tykvov´ a (2003b)) will have a signiﬁcant impact on the post-
IPO performance of the ﬁrms they have brought public.
We do this in two steps. In the ﬁrst one, we investigate the post-IPO returns and
ask, among other things, whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between diﬀerent
types of VCs. In a second step, we look into the eﬀect of VCs on IPO prices
and after-IPO price ﬂuctuations from a diﬀerent angle. We analyze the pricing
precision of venture-backed ﬁrms by looking at the post-IPO idiosyncratic volatility
of returns on ﬁrms backed by diﬀerent VCs. Thereby we take up an argument made
12by Neus/Walz (2003), on the basis of a theoretical analysis of the exit choices of
VCs, that experienced VCs are able to price their portfolio more precisely leading
to less volatility in the post-IPO market. Their arguments basically rest on the fact
that experienced VCs can use the reputation they have acquired as repeated players
in the IPO market to signal the quality of their ﬁrms. Thus, they are able to exit at
the “true” prices leading to less underpricing and less after-IPO volatility of returns.
In order to pursue our ﬁrst step we employ various techniques. First, we under-
take a cross-section analysis of post-IPO returns. Second, we employ a matching
procedure with the purpose of comparing (abnormal) returns on similar ﬁrms.
Due to our data set and the speciﬁc situation of the German venture capital
market we concentrate on a two-year time span after the IPO. Since the bulk of
all IPOs took place in 2000, a longer time period would exclude a large number of
IPOs. In contrast, a shorter time span stands in contrast to our goal to investigate
long-run performance of shares in the post-IPO period. Thereby, due to the speciﬁc
constraints of our data set, we deviate from the convention of researchers using
US data to look at three or even ﬁve year returns (see e.g. Ritter (1991) and
Brav/Gompers (1997)).
3.2 Methodological Issues
A growing research analyzes the methodology of performance measurement and
addresses the questions how risk and return should be quantiﬁed appropriately and
how well-speciﬁed test statistics should be designed. Ritter/Welch (2002) argue that
many of the phenomena found in the IPO literature depend upon the time period
examined. Most authors agree that the result of the performance measurement
is always conditional on the underlying model (e.g. Brav/Gompers (1997) and
Gompers/Lerner (2003)) and the statistical tests (e.g. Barber/Lyon (1997), Lyon
et al. (1999) or Kothari/Warner (1997)) used. Therefore, we use several methods
to check whether the diﬀerences between the diﬀerent types of VCs are robust. In
the following, the main ﬁndings from the recent literature will be summarized and
reasons for approaches used in this paper will be given.
The early research on the post-IPO stock performance on the U.S. market (and
almost all studies for Germany) compares returns on newly listed ﬁrms to returns
on market-wide indices. The basic shortcoming of this approach is that it implies for
all ﬁrms the same average systematic risk (beta equal to one) that is constant over
time. A lot of studies that use this methodology exist for German data, analyzing
the performance of IPOs before the Neuer Markt was introduced. Two examples of
English-written studies are Ljungqvist (1997) and Bessler/Thies (2002).
13More sophisticated methods that control for risk have been developed and used
(for U.S. data). Beginning with Ritter (1991), various matching approaches have
been introduced, matching sample ﬁrms to either single control ﬁrms (matching
one-to-one) or to portfolios. In the earlier studies, ﬁrms have been matched on size
(Loughran/Ritter (1995)) or size and industry (Ritter (1991)), in later studies on size
and book-to-market (Brav/Gompers (1997) or Brav et al. (2000)). Barber/Lyon
(1997) have shown that matching on a one-to-one-basis is the most adequate bench-
mark concept. It does not suﬀer from the rebalancing and the skewness bias (as do
methods using equally weighted portfolios) since both the sample and control ﬁrm
returns are calculated without rebalancing and without averaging. Our one-to-one
matching approach in section 3.4 eliminates as well the new listing bias since both
the sample and control ﬁrm are listed at “nearly” the same time. We use diﬀerent
approaches to match ﬁrms to control ﬁrms. In each of these approaches, sample
ﬁrms are matched to a control ﬁrm on the basis of speciﬁed ﬁrm characteristics
(market value of equity and book-to-market ratio at the IPO) and the IPO tim-
ing. However, matching one-to-one induces the noise of selecting potential outliers,
particularly if samples are small. Thus, additionally, we match ﬁrms to portfolios
instead of single ﬁrms and obtain similar results.
Alternatively to matching, time-series three-factor models designed by Fama/
French (1993) are commonly used to analyze the post-IPO performance (e.g. Brav/
Gompers (1997) and Brav et al. (2000)). Hereby, portfolio returns are regressed
on the market (beta) factor, size and book-to-market eﬀects. Some studies consider
additional factors, e.g. leverage and liquidity (see Eckbo/Norli (2000)) or the pre-
vious return (see Brav et al. (2000)). Due to a short horizon and lack of data on
factors for Germany we do not perform factor model analysis. Instead, in section 3.3
we employ a cross-section analysis similar to Ritter (1991). We regress ﬁrm returns
on the market return, various control variables (size, book-to-market, age, industry
dummies) and types of VCs.
In most of the analyses in the paper, we exclude ﬁrms that left the market during
the period under consideration. We address the issue of the potential survivor bias
in section 3.4 where we include the (eight) ﬁrms which left the market on the basis of
their 1-year return. The results did not change very much compared to the matching
without these ﬁrms.
Last but not least, the studies on performance often suﬀer from bad test statis-
tics. However, using matching one-to-one as in section 3.4, the test statistics are
well speciﬁed (see Barber/Lyon (1997)). We address this problem in section 3.3 as
well. We assume heteroscedasticity and employ corrected t-test statistics.
14Post-IPO returns in this paper are measured as buy-and-hold (abnormal) returns.
Dividends are included. The window over which the post-IPO buy-and-hold returns
are recorded is two years. In section 3.4, we calculate the diﬀerences between the VC-
types based on both, the buy-and-hold returns and the wealth relatives. However,
no considerable diﬀerences can be detected.
3.3 Cross-Section Analysis of Returns
In a ﬁrst step, we explore the determinants of the post-IPO returns in a cross-section
analysis. We deﬁne performance (rt) as:
rt =
Pt+1 + Dt+1 ¡ Pt
Pt
;
with Pt (Pt+1) being the share price at the IPO (two years after the IPO) and,
additionally, the dividends during the two-year period (Dt+1) are taken into account.
Our ultimate goal is to look into potential eﬀects of diﬀerent types of VCs on the
returns on their portfolio ﬁrms. In order to isolate these eﬀects we include various
variables which control e.g. for size, age, and industry (9 industry dummies) of
the particular ﬁrm. We use the market value of the ﬁrms at the time of the IPO
as proxy for ﬁrm size. The book-to-market ratio (at the time of the IPO) serves
as an indicator for the market expectation of future growth potentials. Market
return (measured as the two-year return on the NEMAX All Share Index) in the
corresponding period takes market developments into account.
We exclude one particular outlier, EM.TV, from all our calculations. This ﬁrm
shows impressive returns in the two-year post-IPO period, but little later it turns
out to be one of the most widely-discussed cases of fraud in the Neuer Markt.
Since EM.TV extremely outperforms all other ﬁrms, it would clearly dominate the
estimations. In order to exclude this particular inﬂuence we decided to eliminate
EM.TV from our sample.
Table 5 delineates our results. We estimated six models which diﬀer with respect
to sample size as well as variables included. The basic model (Model I) embraces the
entire sample and includes, besides the main control variables, the dummy variables
depicting the diﬀerent types of VCs. The baseline model already reveals the main
pattern, which turns out to be rather robust throughout the various speciﬁcations.
We ﬁnd in Model I a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of INDEP on two-year returns. That
is, ﬁrms backed by independent VCs performed signiﬁcantly (at the ten percent
level) better than their counterparts which were either backed by other VCs or not
venture-backed at all. We ﬁnd negative, but insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients for the PUBLIC
and CORP variable. Our data also indicate that ﬁrms backed by bank-dependent
15Table 5: Cross-section regressions of two-year post-IPO returns
This table reports the results of diﬀerent cross-section OLS regressions of two-year post-IPO re-
turns.
The sample includes all venture-backed and all non venture-backed IPOs in the 1997-2002 period
on the Neuer Markt, Frankfurt. We excluded two ﬁrms, VIVA and EM.TV.
t-statistics (corrected for heteroscedasticity using Huber-White-sandwich estimator) are in paren-
theses. Industry dummies are used as control variables, but not reported in the table. The
coeﬃcient of the constant used in the estimations is left out as well.
One, two and three asterisks indicate signiﬁcance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. An asterisk in
brackets points to signiﬁcance at the 15 percent level.
I: II: III: IV: V: VI:
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample VC-Sample VC-Sample
and national and other and and national
origin market hotissue origin
participants
MV (¤10¡6) 2:4 1:8 1:7 2:3 ¡1911:9 ¡2072:5
(0:26) (0:19) (0:20) (0:26) (¡1:94)¤ (¡2:02) ¤ ¤
BTM (¤10¡6) 1:1 0:8 0:9 0:6 10:3 8:4
(0:65) (0:46) (0:55) (0:36) (1:53)(¤) (1:26)
MARKET2Y 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:5 1:6 1:6
(2:76)¤¤¤ (2:77)¤¤¤ (2:52) ¤ ¤ (1:90)¤ (2:92)¤¤¤ (2:94)¤¤¤
AGE (¤10¡6) ¡6:3 ¡7:1 ¡18:0 2:5 ¡6:2 ¡4:6
(¡0:22) (¡0:25) (¡0:66) (0:10) (¡0:15) (¡0:11)
BANK 0:2 0:6 0:5 0:5 0:4 ¡0:3
(0:44) (2:01) ¤ ¤ (1:72)¤ (1:41) (0:47) (¡0:44)
CORP ¡0:01 0:4 0:5 0:3 0:8
(¡0:03) (1:11) (1:64)(¤) (0:97) (1:14)
INDEP 0:6 0:7 0:7 0:8 1:4 0:2
(1:73)¤ (1:84)¤ (1:79)¤ (1:90)¤ (1:68)¤ (0:60)
PUBLIC ¡0:5 0:1 0:3 0:04 ¡0:6
(¡0:98) (0:26) (0:57) (0:07) (¡0:78)
GERM ¡0:6 ¡0:7 ¡0:5 ¡0:7
(¡1:92)¤ (¡2:38) ¤ ¤ (¡1:76)¤ (¡1:92)¤
DSRANK 0:03
(0:45)
UNDRANK ¡0:02
(¡0:78)
HOTISSUE 1:3
(0:90)
# of obs. 308 308 307 308 118 118
R2 0:35 0:35 0:36 0:37 0:48 0:49
16VCs tend to perform relatively better than all other ﬁrms. This eﬀect is, however,
not signiﬁcant at a ten percent level. With respect to the control variables we ﬁnd
a strong and highly signiﬁcant positive impact of market returns. The remaining
control variables are insigniﬁcant.
In a further step (Model II) we also included a variable measuring the national
decent of the VC. This variable (GERM) indicates that ﬁrms backed by non-German
VCs do outperform the others. This might be explained by the longer track-record
of international VCs, an inﬂuence which is underestimated by the capital markets.
The inclusion of other market participants (namely the designated sponsors and
the lead underwriter(s)) does not really change the above picture (see Model III).
The inclusion of these two variables leads to a stronger signiﬁcance of GERM. Adding
the HOTISSUE variable (Model IV) does not change the picture. The positive sign
of INDEP remains signiﬁcant.
If we consider only our VC-sample and thereby compare the diﬀerent types of
VCs with each other, the overall picture is not altered. Firms being backed by
independent VCs outperform ﬁrms which have been ﬁnanced by other VCs (see
Model V). If we take GERM in the VC-sample into account, most of the eﬀect of
INDEP is picked up by this variable (see Model VI).
The overall picture is, however, quite clear-cut. There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the two-year performance of ﬁrms backed by diﬀerent VCs and non venture-
backed IPOs. In the group of the venture-backed ﬁrms we ﬁnd a consistent pattern.
Firms ﬁnanced through independent VCs did signiﬁcantly better (or given the over-
all market trend in our period of investigation not worse) than the other ﬁrms in
the Neuer Markt. The BANK variable is typically positive but in most cases not
signiﬁcant. If we take the national origin of the VCs into account we ﬁnd that
ﬁrms backed by international VCs tend to perform signiﬁcantly better than oth-
ers. Obviously, this eﬀect, which should result from the experience of international
VCs as monitors, is not discounted by the market participants reﬂecting potential
ineﬃciencies of a young capital market.
3.4 Matching Returns ‘One-To-One’
In the next step, we match ﬁrms on one-to-one basis using eight diﬀerent approaches.
In order to deal with the diﬀerences between venture and non venture-backed com-
panies and among diﬀerent types of VCs, we divide the sample into six groups (VC,
NON-VC, PUBL, BANK, INDEP and CORP). For each ﬁrm from a certain group
(e.g. PUBL), we choose a control ﬁrm from another group (e.g. NON-VC). The dif-
ferences among the matching methods used can be found in the (a) period in which
17the (abnormal) returns are measured and (b) restrictions posed on the group of po-
tential matching ﬁrms. For each approach, the most similar ﬁrms are put together
and their return diﬀerences are analyzed. The “similarity” is measured in terms of
size, book-to-market ratio and the IPO timing. We always use two-year buy-and-
hold returns (BHR). The results are depicted in table 6. The superior performance
of venture-backed ﬁrms, particularly of the group ﬁnanced by independent VCs, has
been conﬁrmed. Moreover, ﬁrms backed by a public VC perform signiﬁcantly worse
than companies from other groups.
We use two diﬀerent observation periods. In (1) - (4), we follow each issuing ﬁrm
over two years from its IPO date. We compare the abnormal return (= ﬁrm return
minus NEMAX All Share return) on the sample and the control ﬁrm:
ABNORMALi ¡ ABNORMALc:
Hereby, the periods in which returns on the ﬁrm i and c are measured may slightly
diﬀer because of diﬀerent IPO dates. However, the inclusion of the market return
should control for this eﬀect.
In (5) - (8), the measurement period is the same for both, the sample and the
control ﬁrm. It starts three weeks after the IPO of the ﬁrm with the later IPO (time
t) and lasts for two years (time t + 2).9 We compare the return on the sample and
the control ﬁrm:
(BHR between t and t + 2)i ¡ (BHR between t and t + 2)c:
To check whether the disparities are robust over diﬀerent control ﬁrms’ samples,
we use varying restrictions on the group of matching ﬁrms. In (1) and (5), we
match venture-backed ﬁrms only to venture-backed ﬁrms ﬁnanced by a diﬀerent
type of venture capitalist. Thus, a ﬁrm backed e.g. by a public VC may be matched
with a ﬁrm backed by a corporate, bank-dependent or independent VC. Using this
approach, the diﬀerences between diﬀerent types of VCs are focused on. In (2) and
(6), we compare ﬁrms backed by diﬀerent types of VCs to non venture-backed ﬁrms.
Thus, each venture-backed ﬁrm is matched to the most similar non venture-backed
ﬁrm. In (3) and (7), the group of potential matching ﬁrms includes all ﬁrms with
the exception of ﬁrms backed by the same type of VC as the sample ﬁrm. Thus, a
ﬁrm backed e.g. by a public VC may be matched to a ﬁrm backed by a corporate,
bank-dependent or independent VC or to a non venture-backed ﬁrm. In (4) and (8),
the group of matching ﬁrms is restricted for the non venture-backed sample ﬁrms
9The reason for not starting at the date of the later IPO is the high volatility immediately after
the listing.
18Table 6: Matching one-to-one, average return diﬀerences; sample vs. control ﬁrm
This table reports the means of the diﬀerence in two-year buy-and-hold returns between a sample ﬁrm i and a
control ﬁrm c for venture-backed ﬁrms (VC), non venture-backed ﬁrms (NON-VC) and ﬁrms backed by diﬀerent
types of VCs (PUBLIC, BANK, INDEP, CORP).
The sample includes all venture-backed and all non venture-backed IPOs in the 1997-2002 period on the Neuer
Markt, Frankfurt. We excluded two ﬁrms, VIVA and EM.TV.
For (1) to (4): ABNORMALi ¡ ABNORMALc.
For (5) to (8): (buy-and-hold return between t and t + 2)i ¡ (buy-and-hold return between t and t + 2)c.
Standard deviations are in parentheses. Number of observations is in italics.
“+” indicates that the diﬀerence in means of the matched returns between a certain group (VC, NON-VC,
PUBL, etc.) and the rest is signiﬁcant (a standard two-sided t-test allowing for unequal variances)
“*” indicates that the diﬀerence in medians of the matched returns between a certain group (VC, NON-VC,
PUBL, etc.) and the rest is signiﬁcant (a nonparametric two-sample test on the equality of medians with the
test chi-squared statistic without a continuity correction)
“y” indicates that the average return diﬀerence between a sample and a control ﬁrm in a certain group is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 (a standard two-sided t-test)
+++, ***, y y y indicate signiﬁcance at the 1 % level; ++, **, yy indicate signiﬁcance at the 5 % level;
+, *, y indicate signiﬁcance at the 10 % level; (+), (*), (y) indicate signiﬁcance at the 15 % level
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ABNORMAL RETURNS, DIFFERENT PERIODS
SAMPLE:
VC NON-VC PUBL BANK INDEP CORP
-0.55 * -0.44 (*) 0.21 ** -0.08
(1) - - (1.06) (3.32) (1.88) (0.35)
9 38 63 8
-0.19 + * 0.45 0.30 (*) -0.20 +
(2) - - (0.52) (2.43) (1.92) (0.52)
9 37 62 8
0.29 + (y) -0.08 + -0.20 0.45 0.30 0.00
(3) (1.95) (1.55) (0.55) (2.39) (1.92) (0.18)
117 190 9 38 62 8
0.29 +++ (y) -0.54 +++ y y y -0.20 * 0.45 + 0.30 ++ 0.00 (+)
(4) (1.95) (2.51) (0.55) (2.39) (1.92) (0.18)
117 190 9 38 62 8
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RETURNS, SAME PERIOD
SAMPLE:
VC NON-VC PUBL BANK INDEP CORP
-0.29 -0.50 + (*) 0.25 ++ * y 0.00
(5) - - (0.84) (2.18) (0.97) (0.10)
9 38 59 8
-0.15 + ** 0.67 0.18 (*) -0.08 (+)
(6) - - (0.50) (3.07) (1.47) (0.35)
9 36 59 7
0.31 + y -0.07 + -0.15 ** 0.60 0.24 0.00
(7) (1.96) (1.68) (0.53) (2.88) (1.42) (0.12)
112 185 9 37 59 7
0.31 +++ y -0.53 +++ y y y -0.15 ** 0.60 + 0.24 ++ 0.00
(8) (1.96) (2.72) (0.53) (2.88) (1.42) (0.12)
112 185 9 37 59 7
19as well since they are matched only to venture-backed ﬁrms. The group of potential
matching ﬁrms for venture-backed ﬁrms includes all ﬁrms with the exception of ﬁrms
backed by the same type of VC as the sample ﬁrm. As a consequence of this design,
in (1), (2), (5) and (6) the group of sample ﬁrms consists only of venture-backed
ﬁrms whereas in (3), (4), (7) and (8), non venture-backed ﬁrms are included in the
analysis as well.
Having deﬁned the group of potential matching ﬁrms (e.g. non venture-backed
ﬁrms in (2) and (6)) for each sample ﬁrm i, we search within this group for such
companies that went public in a period that started three months before and ended
three month after the IPO of the sample ﬁrm i. Within this restricted group of
potential matching ﬁrms for ﬁrm i, we choose that control ﬁrm c that minimizes:
j
MVc ¡ MVi
MVaverage
j + j
BTMc ¡ BTMi
BTMaverage
j;
where MVaverage and BTMaverage are measured over the whole sample of 326 ﬁrms.
The mean diﬀerences in returns between sample and control ﬁrms in each group
are depicted in table 6. We have 117 (112) pairs of matched ﬁrms in the ﬁrst group
(VC), 190 (185) ﬁrms in the group NON-VC, 9 ﬁrms in the group PUBL, 36-38 ﬁrms
in the group BANK, 58-63 ﬁrms in the group INDEP and 7-8 ﬁrms in the group
CORP. The reason for the diﬀerence in the number of matched pairs for diﬀerent
approaches is that in some cases no matching ﬁrm could have been identiﬁed since
the set of potential matching ﬁrms has been empty. For seven ﬁrms that went
public after the April 1, 2001, we did not have data on two-year-returns because
our time-series on returns end in March 2003.10 Eight ﬁrms left the market during
the two years after their IPO. These ﬁrms (two of them are venture-backed) are not
considered in table 6.
Venture-backed ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly higher two-year returns than non venture-
backed ﬁrms. This result is robust over the various matching approaches. The
average returns on ﬁrms backed by public VCs are always lower than the average
returns on matched ﬁrms. The diﬀerence in (abnormal) returns is particularly large
when we match publicly-backed ﬁrms only to ﬁrms ﬁnanced by another type of VC
(approach (1) and (5)). On the whole, the diﬀerence in medians of the matched
returns is almost always highly statistically signiﬁcant and negative for public VCs
compared to other groups. The average returns on ﬁrms backed by an independent
VC are always higher than the average returns on other ﬁrms. When we match only
10Logically, for (5) - (8), where the measurement period starts three weeks after the IPO of the
ﬁrm with the later IPO, the samples are smaller than in (1) - (4), where the two-year span begins
at the IPO date.
20within venture-backed ﬁrms, ﬁrms backed by an independent VC are the only group
that has positive matched returns on average. The average diﬀerence in matched
returns on ﬁrms backed by a corporate or a bank-dependent VC vary from approach
to approach. Compared to other venture-backed ﬁrms, ﬁrms backed by a bank-
dependent VC have signiﬁcantly lower returns and ﬁrms backed by a corporate VC
have approximately the same returns on average.
We carried through three further analyses to check the robustness of our results.
First, we included ﬁrms that left the market during the period under consideration
on the basis of their one-year returns to control for the potential survivor bias.
Second, we matched ﬁrms on a portfolio- instead on the one-to-one-basis. Third,
we used wealth relatives instead of the BHR. In all these alternative approaches,
the positive impact of venture capital-backing, particularly of independent venture
capital, on performance was conﬁrmed. On the other hand, the inferior performance
of companies backed by public VCs held as well. The results are not reported here.
3.5 Post-IPO Return Volatility
In this section, we look at the diﬀerences in the two-year post-IPO idiosyncratic
volatility of returns. We will show that a part of this volatility can be explained
by the IPO timing, the venture capitalists’ and ﬁrm characteristics. In doing so
we want to explore whether venture capitalists (resp. diﬀerent types of venture
capitalists) are better able to overcome potential informational asymmetries with
respect to ﬁrm characteristics. The basic idea thereby is that venture capitalists can
use their (current and/or future) reputation to price the shares of their ﬁrms better
than in the case of non venture-backed ﬁrms. That implies that, in the aftermath
of the IPO, there will be less adjustment towards the “true” market price, leading
to less post-IPO ﬂuctuation (see Neus/Walz (2003) for a detailed theoretical model
of this hypothesis).
In table 7 we regress the two-year post-IPO idiosyncratic volatility (resulting
from the CAPM) on some further variables concerning the ﬁrm characteristics, the
market situation, the rank of designated sponsors and the lead underwriter(s), the
VC’s characteristics and involvement. We estimate six models which diﬀer with
respect to sample size and variables included. Several of our variables help explain
a part of the idiosyncratic volatility.
In general, the participation of venture capitalists decreases the volatility as
implied by Neus/Walz (2003). However, the venture capitalists’ impact depends on
their type and the extent of their lock-up. In line with our previous results, we
ﬁnd a positive impact of independent VCs. Companies backed by independent VCs
21Table 7: Cross-section regressions of the idiosyncratic volatility
This table depicts the results of cross-section OLS regressions of idiosyncratic volatility (from
CAPM).
The sample includes all venture-backed and all non venture-backed IPOs in the 1997-2002
period on the Neuer Markt, Frankfurt. We excluded VIVA.
t-statistics (corrected for heteroscedasticity using Huber-White-sandwich estimator) are in
parentheses. Industry dummies are used as control variables, but not reported in the table.
The coeﬃcient of the constant used in the estimations is left out as well.
One, two and three asterisks indicate signiﬁcance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. An asterisk
in brackets points to signiﬁcance at the 15 percent level.
I: II: III: IV: V: VI:
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample VC-Sample VC-Sample VC-Sample
and other and VC and other and national and
market market origin reputation
participants participants
MV(¤10¡9) ¡7:49 ¡2:06 ¡1:27 ¡7:12 ¡42:70 ¡22:20
(¡0:46) (¡0:13) (¡0:08) (¡0:05) (¡0:28) (¡0:14)
BTM(¤10¡9) 1:22 1:19 1:22 0:82 1:06 1:12
(2:91)¤¤¤ (3:28)¤¤¤ (3:37)¤¤¤ (1:00) (1:42) (1:51)(¤)
AGE(¤10¡9) ¡9:70 ¡12:90 ¡12:50 ¡8:42 ¡8:53 ¡9:53
(¡3:13)¤¤¤ (¡4:52)¤¤¤ (¡4:39)¤¤¤ (¡1:99) ¤ ¤ (¡2:06) ¤ ¤ (¡2:29) ¤ ¤
SIZE(¤10¡15) ¡0:09 ¡98:60 ¡113:00 262:00 484:00 287:00
(¡0:00) (¡0:45) (¡0:53) (0:36) (0:67) (0:39)
CORP(¤10¡6) ¡5:87
(¡0:08)
INDEP(¤10¡5) ¡11:01 ¡7:21 ¡7:28
(¡2:62)¤¤¤ (¡1:97) ¤ ¤ (¡1:65)(¤)
PUBL(¤10¡5) ¡7:67 ¡9:67 ¡6:18
(¡0:84) (¡1:27) (¡0:79)
GERM(¤10¡5) 5:79
(1:47)(¤)
RANK(¤10¡5) 2:27
(1:49)(¤)
LOCK(¤10¡6) 0:89 0:68 1:91 2:06 2:20 2:03
(2:10) ¤ ¤ (1:73)¤ (3:05)¤¤¤ (3:06)¤¤¤ (3:18)¤¤¤ (3:06)¤¤¤
VC(¤10¡5) ¡15:78
(¡3:21)¤¤¤
DSRANK ¡3:4 ¡3:29 ¡3:04 ¡3:13 ¡3:47
(¤10¡5) (¡5:28)¤¤¤ (¡5:16)¤¤¤ (¡3:42)¤¤¤ (¡3:40)¤¤¤ (¡3:81)¤¤¤
UNDRANK 5:35 3:10 ¡3:78 ¡3:78 ¡6:08
(¤10¡6) (0:85) (0:49) (¡0:38) (¡0:36) (¡0:60)
HOTISSUE ¡8:52 ¡5:28 ¡6:08 ¡4:80 ¡4:82 ¡6:00
(¤10¡5) (¡2:17) ¤ ¤ (¡1:54)(¤) (¡1:75)¤ (¡0:85) (¡0:92) (¡1:13)
# of obs. 321 315 315 117 117 117
R2 0:14 0:21 0:22 0:33 0:32 0:32
22show a relatively lower idiosyncratic volatility than other ﬁrms (generating a higher
return at the same time). Moreover, as expected, shares of foreign VCs and VCs
with a better rank are less volatile. As short-term investors, venture capitalists try
to divest themselves of their shares rather quickly. This leads to an increase in the
volatility of these shares. Thus, the larger the lock-up by venture capitalists is, the
higher is the idiosyncratic volatility.
Younger ﬁrms, which are more risky than their older counterparts, show a higher
idiosyncratic volatility. Two results from table 7 contradict our predictions: The
ﬁnding of a positive impact of the book-to-market ratio on the idiosyncratic volatility
is inconsistent with the Fama/French (1993) result that value stocks are actually
less volatile than the general market. We as well cannot explain why the reputation
of designated sponsors plays a negative role and, thus, a better rank increases the
volatility.
4 Underpricing
4.1 Our Focus
Several studies look at the diﬀerences in underpricing of venture- and non venture-
backed companies (see section 1). Our focus is to a large extent a diﬀerent one.
Instead of comparing venture- and non venture-backed IPOs, we follow our previous
route of analysis and investigate potential underpricing diﬀerences between the dif-
ferent types of venture capital ﬁrms. Thereby, we control for other factors such as
growth potential (using the book-to-market-ratio as proxy) and ﬁrm size (proxied
by market value).
We investigate the following VC-related hypotheses:
² Independent VCs are more able to resolve informational asymmetries. Their
portfolio ﬁrms display less underpricing.
² Bank-dependent VCs are seen as having potential conﬂicts of interest with the
underwriter (see Hamao et al. (2000) and Gompers/Lerner (1999a)) forcing
them to underprice more than other venture-backed ﬁrms.
² Public VCs are mainly interested in the success of their IPO allowing therefore
more underpricing.
² The more reputable and the older the VCs (see Gompers (1996) and Neus/Walz
(2003)) are, the less pronounced underpricing is expected to take place.
234.2 Underpricing of IPOs Backed by Diﬀerent Types of VCs
The results of our cross-section analysis are displayed in table 8. By and large
we can not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀects of the diﬀerent types of VCs on the extent of
underpricing when controlling for market value, book-to-market ratio, the age of the
ﬁrm, the market conditions and the issue size. With the latter variable we take up
the idea of Ljungqvist (1999). He argues that underpricing is less costly if the total
size of the issue is small, thereby creating incentives to invest in costly marketing,
in order to induce lower underpricing, only for large issues. Market conditions are
approximated by the average extent of underpricing in the ﬁve IPOs preceding the
respective ﬁrm (RECENT).
In neither regression we can ﬁnd any signiﬁcant impact of the diﬀerent types of
VCs on the degree of underpricing. The coeﬃcient of BANK and PUBLIC is posi-
tive, as expected, indicating that ﬁrms backed by these types of VCs are underpriced
to a larger extent. These coeﬃcients are, however, never signiﬁcant. Hence, the ex-
planation of Hamao et al. (2000) for the higher degree of underpricing, namely the
informational and incentive problems stemming from bank-dependent VCs being
responsible for the higher underpricing level, is not supported by our data set. With
respect to INDEP the sign is not clear-cut. Our Models IV-VI reveal a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence of the VC’s reputation on underpricing. The sign of RANK is, however, in
contrast to our theoretical considerations: The more reputable a VC is, the higher
is the degree of underpricing of its portfolio ﬁrm. This negative and signiﬁcant co-
eﬃcient remains even if we include the VC-type variables and the GERM variable
which has a positive impact on the extent of underpricing (see Models IV and VI).
We do not ﬁnd any support for the certiﬁcation role of the underwriters.
The Ljungqvist-hypothesis that the size of the issue has a negative impact on
the degree of underpricing is strongly supported in our regressions. We also ﬁnd
a strong positive impact of market conditions on the degree of underpricing. If
previous issues have been heavily underpriced (indicating a hot issue period), it
is most likely to be true for the issue under consideration. The book-to-market
ratio has always a negative impact. That is, ﬁrms with a higher expected growth
potential (i.e. with a lower book-to-market ratio) are more underpriced. Above
this, larger and older ﬁrms are underpriced more which contradicts our intuition.
On the contrary, a higher VCs’ retention rate (LOCK) is obviously interpreted by
the market as a signal and, thus, induces a lower underpricing.
24Table 8: Cross-section regressions of underpricing
This table reports the results of diﬀerent cross-section OLS regressions of underpricing.
The sample includes the entire sample of all venture-backed and all non venture-backed IPOs
in the 1997-2002 period on the Neuer Markt, Frankfurt. We excluded two ﬁrms, VIVA and
EM.TV.
t-statistics (corrected for heteroscedasticity using Huber-White-sandwich estimator) are in
parentheses. Industry dummies are used as control variables, but not reported in the table.
The coeﬃcient of the constant used in the estimations is left out as well.
One, two and three asterisks indicate signiﬁcance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. An asterisk
in brackets points to signiﬁcance at the 15 % level.
I: II: III: IV: V: VI:
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample VC-Sample VC-Sample VC-Sample,
and VC and other and and national and national origin
market VC-types origin VC-types and
participants VC-types
MV(¤10¡6) 210:20 208:80 205:20 2162:70 2225:40 2170:20
(4:19)¤¤¤ (4:24)¤¤¤ (4:17)¤¤¤ (3:73)¤¤¤ (3:72)¤¤¤ (3:62)¤¤¤
BTM(¤10¡6) ¡2:40 ¡2:47 ¡2:47 ¡2:46 ¡2:93 ¡2:78
(¡2:57) ¤ ¤ (¡2:53) ¤ ¤ (¡2:58)¤¤¤ (¡1:59)(¤) (¡1:79)¤ (¡1:73)¤
AGE(¤10¡6) 8:76 10:40 8:66 22:30 22:00 22:70
(1:08) (1:19) (1:06) (2:32) ¤ ¤ (2:29) ¤ ¤ (2:31) ¤ ¤
SIZE(¤10¡9) ¡2:92 ¡2:92 ¡2:86 ¡10:20 ¡10:50 ¡10:10
(¡4:58)¤¤¤ (¡4:64)¤¤¤ (¡4:57)¤¤¤ (¡3:70)¤¤¤ (¡3:75)¤¤¤ (¡3:57)¤¤¤
RECENT 0:75 0:75 0:75 0:47 0:46 0:47
(7:94)¤¤¤ (7:82)¤¤¤ (7:95)¤¤¤ (5:02)¤¤¤ (4:69)¤¤¤ (4:92)¤¤¤
INDEP ¡0:001 0:02 ¡0:06 0:01
(¡0:01) (0:23) (¡0:43) (0:04)
BANK 0:09 0:11 0:10
(0:72) (0:69) (0:55)
PUBLIC 0:23 0:13 0:08
(0:95) (0:51) (0:31)
GERM 0:20 0:17
(1:98)¤ (1:36)
RANK ¡0:10 ¡0:08 ¡0:10
(¡2:99)¤¤¤ (¡2:43) ¤ ¤ (¡2:93)¤¤¤
DSRANK ¡0:003
(¡0:16)
UNDRANK 0:005
(0:29)
VC 0:05
(0:78)
LOCK ¡0:003 ¡0:004 ¡0:003
(¡1:64)(¤) (¡1:97)¤ (¡1:66)¤
# of obs. 318 312 318 118 118 118
R2 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.48 0.48 0.48
255 Summary and Concluding Remarks
The main objective of the present paper was to investigate the impact of VCs’
corporate governance, their experience and their objectives on the performance of
their portfolio ﬁrms around and after the IPO. Thereby, we wanted to shed some
additional light on the function of venture capital in nurturing and developing their
portfolio ﬁrms as well on some mechanisms of the IPO market. Our main working
hypothesis was that venture capital is too heterogenous as to simply allow to compare
non venture and venture-backed ﬁrms.
In order to pursue our objective we compared the performance of ﬁrms backed by
diﬀerent VCs and non-venture backed ﬁrms in the course of the IPO, by looking at
the extent of underpricing, as well as on post-IPO returns and volatility. Germany’s
Neuer Markt has proven to be a natural playing ﬁeld for such a research strategy
with a number of obvious advantages, but, however, with a disadvantage as well. The
main advantage is that, due to the speciﬁc situation of the German venture capital
market (young, rapidly growing market coupled with a strong public sector), we ﬁnd
a wide array of diﬀerent types of venture capitalists with quite diﬀerent structures,
objectives and track record. Our main aim was to exploit just this diﬀerence and
its impact on the performance of portfolio ﬁrms. The disadvantage is closely related
to the advantages: Due to the relative youth of the Neuer Markt we just have a
rather short time series forcing us to restrict our analysis to this short time span
and to two-year performance measures. Despite these limitations we are strongly
convinced that the advantages clearly outweigh the disadvantages.
With respect to post-IPO performance we ﬁnd strong support for our hypotheses.
Investors which have bought shares backed by independent VCs did signiﬁcantly
better in a two-year period after the IPO compared to the investors who relied on
other (matching) ﬁrms in Germany’s Neuer Markt. Somehow surprisingly these
investors were able to sleep better since prices of their shares ﬂuctuated signiﬁcantly
less. Investors having acquired shares of ﬁrms in which the lead VC was a public
one bought into low returns. This leads us to the conclusion that diﬀerent corporate
governance structures, diﬀerent experience levels and diﬀerent objectives among the
diﬀerent types of VCs actually do have an observable and signiﬁcant impact on the
portfolio ﬁrms’ post-IPO performance.
When looking into the determinants of underpricing we ﬁnd rather little evidence
that the extent of underpricing diﬀers signiﬁcantly among ﬁrms backed by diﬀerent
VCs. Furthermore, we ﬁnd, rather surprisingly, that rank of the VC has a positive
impact on underpricing. The fact that we were not able (due to the lack of data on
issue costs, see Ljungqvist (1999)) to fully eliminate potential endogeneity problems
26in our underpricing estimations, however, leads us to a rather cautious interpretation
of our underpricing results.
Our ﬁndings on post-IPO performance as well as the ones in Tykvov´ a (2003a)
imply that the diﬀerent types of VCs obviously fulﬁll their overall task as specialized
monitors, consultants, and ﬁnancier of young ﬁrms quite diﬀerently. Therefore, it
would be very interesting to see whether these diﬀerences also exist in the pre-IPO
period. We leave the task to investigate this with pre-IPO cashﬂow data for our
future research.
27References
Audretsch, D. B., and E. Lehmann (2002): “Does the New Economy Need
New Governance? Ownership, Knowledge, and Performance,” Discussion Paper
3626, CEPR Discussion Paper.
Barber, M. B., and J. D. Lyon (1997): “Detecting Long-Run Abnormal Stock
Returns: The Empirical Power and Speciﬁcation of Test Statistics,” Journal of
Financial Economics, 43, 341–372.
Barry, C. B., C. J. Muscarella, J. W. Peavy, and M. R. Vesuypens
(1990): “The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public Companies,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 447–471.
Bascha, A., and U. Walz (2002): “Financing Practices in the German Ven-
ture Capital Industry: An Empirical Assessment,” Center for Financial Studies
Working Paper Series, No. 2002/08.
Becker, R., and T. Hellmann (2000): “The Genesis of Venture Capital: Lessons
from the German Experience,” mimeo, Stanford University.
Bessler, W., and S. Thies (2002): “Initial Public Oﬀerings, Subsequent Seasoned
Equity Oﬀerings, and Long Run Performance: Evidence from IPOs in Germany,”
Discussion paper.
Black, B. S., and R. J. Gilson (1998): “Venture Capital and the Structure of
Capital Markets: Banks versus Stockmarkets,” Journal of Financial Economics,
47, 243–277.
Brav, A., C. Geczy, and P. A. Gompers (2000): “Is the Abnormal Return
Following Equity Issuances Anomalous,” Journal of Financial Economics, 56,
209–249.
Brav, A., and P. A. Gompers (1997): “Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Under-
performance of Initial Public Oﬀerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure
Capital-Backed Companies,” Journal of Finance, 52(5), 1791–1821.
BVK Jahrbuch 2002.
Cumming, D. J. (2000): “The Convertible Preferred Equity Puzzle in Venture
Capital Finance,” mimeo, University of Alberta.
(2002): “Contracts and Exits in Venture Capital Finance,” working paper.
28Doukas, J. A., and H. Gonenc (2001): “Long-Term Performance of New Equity
Issuers, Venture Capital and Reputation of Investment Bankers,” working paper,
SSRN.
Eckbo, B. E., and . Norli (2000): “Leverage, Liquidity, and Long-Run IPO
Returns,” Discussion paper, Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth.
Fama, E., and K. French (1993): “Common Risk Factors in the Returns of
Stocks and Bonds,” Journal of Financial Economics, 33, 3–55.
Franzke, S. A. (2001): “Underpricing of Venture-Backed and Non Venture-Backed
IPOs: Germany’s Neuer Markt,” working paper 2001/01, Center for Financial
Studies.
Gompers, P. A. (1996): “Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry,” Journal
of Financial Economics, 42, 133–156.
Gompers, P. A., and J. Lerner (1999a): “Conﬂict of Interest in the Issuance
of Public Securities: Evidence from Venture Capital,” Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, 42, 1–28.
(1999b): The Venture Capital Cycle. The MIT Press.
(2000): “The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success: Orga-
nizational Structure, Incentives, and Complementarities,” in Concentrated Own-
ership, ed. by R. Morck, pp. 17–50. University of Chicago Press.
(2003): “The Really Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Oﬀerings:
The Pre-Nasdaq Evidence,” Journal of Finance, 58(4), 1355–1392.
Hamao, Y., F. Packer, and J. R. Ritter (2000): “Institutional Aﬃliation and
the Role of Venture Capital: Evidence from Initial Public Oﬀerings in Japan,”
Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal, 8, 529–558.
Hellmann, T., L. Lindsey, and M. Puri (2003): “Building Relationships Early:
Banks in Venture Capital,” Discussion paper.
Kothari, S. P., and J. B. Warner (1997): “Measuring Long-Horizon Security
Price Performance,” Journal of Financial Economics, 43, 301–339.
Ljungqvist, A. P. (1997): “Pricing Initial Public Oﬀerings: Further Evidence
from Germany,” European Economic Review, 41, 1309–1320.
29(1999): “IPO Underpricing, Wealth Losses and the Curious Role of Ven-
ture Capitalists in the Creation of Public Companies,” working paper, Oxford
University and CEPR.
Loughran, T., and J. R. Ritter (1995): “The New Issues Puzzle,” Journal of
Finance, 50(1), 23–51.
Lyon, J. D., B. M. Barber, and C. Tsai (1999): “Improved Methods for Tests
of Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns,” Journal of Finance, 54(1), 165–201.
Megginson, W. L., and K. A. Weiss (1991): “Venture Capitalist Certiﬁcation
in Initial Public Oﬀerings,” Journal of Finance, 46(3), 879–903.
Neus, W., and U. Walz (2003): “Exit Timing of Venture Capitalists in the Course
of an Initial Public Oﬀering,” Center for Financial Studies Working Paper Series,
No. 2002/07.
Rindermann, G. (2003): “Venture Capitalist Participation and the Performance of
IPO Firms: Empirical Evidence from France, Germany, and the UK,” Discussion
paper.
Ritter, J. R. (1991): “The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Oﬀerings,”
Journal of Finance, 46(1), 3–27.
Ritter, J. R., and I. Welch (2002): “A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and
Allocations,” Journal of Finance, 57(4), 1795–1828.
Rock, K. (1986): “Why New Issues Are Underpriced,” Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics, 15, 187–212.
Smart, S. B., and C. J. Zutter (2003): “Control as a Motivation for Under-
pricing: A Comparison of Dual-and Single-Class IPOs,” Journal of Financial
Economics, 69(1), 85–110.
Tykvov a, T. (2003a): “Is the Behavior of German Venture Capitalists Diﬀerent?
Evidence from the Neuer Markt,” Discussion Paper 03-44, ZEW.
(2003b): “Venture-Backed IPOs: Investment Duration and Lock-Up by
Venture Capitalists,” Finance Letters, 1(2), forthcoming.
30CFS Working Paper Series: 
 
No.  Author(s)  Title 
2003/40  Athanasios Orphanides 
John C. Williams 
Imperfect Knowledge, Inflation Expectations, 
and Monetary Policy 
2003/41  Sharon Kozicki 
P.A. Tinsley 
Permanent and Transitory Policy Shocks in an 
Empirical Macro Model with Asymmetric 
Information 
2003/42  Mordecai Kurz 
Hehui Jin 
Maurizio Motolese 
The Role of Expectations in Economic 
Fluctuations and the Efficacy of Monetary Policy
2003/43  William A. Brock 
Steven N. Durlauf 
Kenneth D. West 
Policy Evaluation in Uncertain Economic 
Environments 
2003/44  Timothy Cogley 
Sergei Morozov 
Thomas J. Sargent 
Bayesian Fan Charts for U.K. Inflation: 
Forecasting and Sources of Uncertainty in an 
Evolving Monetary System 
2003/45  Guenter W. Beck  Nominal Exchange Rate Regimes and Relative 
Price Dispersion: On the Importance of Nominal 
Exchange Rate Volatility for the Width of the 
Border 
2003/46  Michael Ehrmann 
Marcel Fratzscher 
Equal size, equal role?  
Interest rate interdependence between the euro 
area and the United States 
2003/47  Romain Bouis  IPOs Cycle and Investment in High-Tech 
Industries 
2003/48  Martin D. Dietz  Screening and Advising by a Venture Capitalist 
with a Time Constraint 
2004/01  Ivica Dus 
Raimond Maurer 
Olivia S. Mitchell 
Betting on Death and Capital Markets in 
Retirement: A Shortfall Risk Analysis of Life 
Annuities versus Phased Withdrawal Plans 
2004/02  Tereza Tykvová 
Uwe Walz 
Are IPOs of Different VCs Different? 
 
 
Copies of working papers can be downloaded at http://www.ifk-cfs.de  